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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark Lee Ellis appeals from his conviction for two counts of possession of
sexually exploitative material.

Specifically, Ellis challenges the denial of his

suppression motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The relevant facts as found by the district court in its decision and order
denying Ellis' motion to suppress are as follows:
The defendant was arrested on an agent's warrant for a
parole violation on March 17, 2010. A Parole Commission warrant
was issued on March 25, 2010 for the arrest of the defendant. He
was arrested on the Parole Commission warrant on March 26,
2012. After his arrest, the defendant's parole officer was contacted
by a neighbor who said that she had been asked by the defendant
to go into his apartment and take his methamphetamine pipe, some
drugs, DVDs, and cell phones from a "secret" compartment or
room. On March 30, 2010, as a result of the neighbor's call, the
parole officer went to the defendant's apartment and contacted the
defendant's landlord.
The parole officer mentioned that the
defendant had talked about a "secret room" near the kitchen and
the landlord explained that the "secret room" was a maintenance
area on the porch outside of the defendant's apartment which only
the landlord and his maintenance worker were supposed to use
and access. The landlord then went to the area and opened it up.
The area was closed and then the parole officers and the landlord
entered the defendant's apartment and accessed the "secret room"
from the defendant's apartment. The parole officer recovered
paraphernalia, controlled substances, CDSs/DVDs [sic], and cell
phones and booked them into evidence. The DVDs were examined
by a detective who found file names consistent with child
pornography, Based upon a review of the file names, a search
warrant was sought to permit a more extensive forensic analysis of
the multiple telephones seized and the CDs/DVDs. On July 27,
2010, the Parole Commission entered formal findings that the
defendant had violated his parole and recommended that his parole
be revoked.
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(R., pp.193-194.)

The state charged Ellis with ten separate counts of possession of sexually
exploitative material with a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent
violator.

(R., pp.152-155, 165-166.)

Ellis filed a motion to suppress and two

amended motions to suppress asserting the warrantless search violated his
rights. (R., pp.31-36, 41-46, 104-109.) At a hearing on the motion, the parties
offered no testimony, instead submitting the issues on their briefing. (Tr., pp.69.) The district court took the matter under advisement, ultimately denying the
motion to suppress in a written order:
In conclusion, the defendant lacked any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the storage area/"secret room" because it
was a maintenance area that he was not actually authorized to use.
Even if he were authorized to use it and had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the landlord also had full access to the area
and the right to consent to its search. Moreover, the fact that he
was trying, from custody, to arrange for the destruction of evidence
created an exigency that justified an immediate search to prevent
the removal and destruction of evidence. Finally, although this is a
question of first impression in Idaho, the mere fact that the
defendant was in custody did not invalidate his prior valid Fourth
Amendment waiver which he gave as a condition of receiving
parole. For all of these reasons, the motion to suppress is denied.
(R., p.200.)

Ellis entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of
sexually exploitative material, the state dismissed the remaining eight charges
and withdrew the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and with agreed to
recommend a sentence of five years fixed followed by five years indeterminate
on one count and a 5 year indeterminate sentence to be served consecutively on
the remaining charge. (R., p.202, 205-211; Tr., 19, L.9 - p.30, L.22.)
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The district court sentenced Ellis to five years fixed followed by five years
indeterminate on Count II and five years indeterminate on Count IV to be served
consecutively. (R., pp.218-221; Tr., p.47, L.7 - p.51, L.4.) Ellis timely appeals.
(R., pp.225-229.)
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ISSUE
Ellis states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ellis' motion to suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Ellis failed to show that the district court erred in denying his suppression
motion?
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ARGUMENT
Ellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Ellis' motion to suppress on four grounds. First, it

found Ellis lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the maintenance room
searched.

(R., p.200.) Second, it found the landlord validly consented to the

search of the maintenance room. (Id.) Third, it concluded Ellis' attempt to have
a neighbor remove incriminating· evidence of criminal conduct from the
maintenance room created an exigency allowing a search to be conducted
without a warrant. (Id.) Finally, the district court held Ellis' arrest on a suspected
parole violation did not suspend his valid Fourth Amendment waiver entered as a
condition of parole. (Id.)
Ellis argues "he has standing to challenge the State's entrance into his
apartment and its subsequent discovery of contraband based on a trespass
theory."

(Appellant's brief, p.6-12.)

Ellis further asserts that the district court

erred in finding there was a valid Fourth Amendment waiver in effect at the time
of the search or that there were circumstances present that justified the finding of
third party consent or exigent circumstances. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-29.)
claims fail.

Ellis'

A review of the record, in light of the applicable legal standards,

supports the district court's conclusion that the search of the maintenance room
adjoining Ellis' apartment was justified.
As such, the district court did not err when it denied Ellis' motion to
suppress.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Ellis Has Failed To Establish A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The
Maintenance Room
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an

individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Thus, as a
threshold matter, "one who challenges the legality of a search must establish that
he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing searched." State v.
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). Here, the thing searched was
"a maintenance area on the porch outside of the defendant's apartment which
only the landlord and his maintenance worker were supposed to use and
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access."

(R., p.194.)

Ellis has failed to establish he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in that maintenance room.
Ellis asserts:
[he] need not prove he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the storage area in order to establish standing because Officer
Kiehl's decision to trespass into Mr. Ellis' apartment created the
standing necessary for Mr. Ellis to challenge the legality of the
search of his apartment on the basis of the Fourth Amendment.
(Appellant's brief, p.12.)

Ellis supports his position with the United State's

Supreme Court's decision in US v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (Jan. 23, 2012).

In

Jones, the Court stated that "when the Government does engage in physical
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Jones 132 S.Ct.
at 951 (quoting U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (concurring opinion)).
The Court held that installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle constituted
a search requiring a warrant.

~

Contrary to Ellis' position, however, not all

trespasses will result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 132
S.Ct. at 953 ("an intrusion on an 'open field' did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search even though it was a trespass at common law" (citation
omitted).
The only issue in Jones was whether GPS tracking constituted a "search."
The Court found "the Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949. Here, there is no
doubt there was a search of the maintenance room. Ellis must still show that he
had a valid privacy interest in the place searched. Ellis has not established he
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this maintenance room. Nor has he
shown any "trespass" occurred. Finally, he has failed to show that even if there
was a trespass it rose to the level of being a Fourth Amendment violation.
The entry into Ellis' apartment was not a search of his apartment, nor did
the utilization of his apartment as an access to the maintenance room eliminate
the need of Ellis to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in such room in
order to contest the search.

The maintenance room was accessed by the

landlord 'from the porch outside Ellis' apartment, where the landlord noticed that
"items near the door that would open into Mark Eiiis's apartment had been
moved."

(R., p.67 (Defendant's Ex. 3).)

Upon making this observation, the

landlord locked up the room, retrieved screwdrivers, and went in through Ellis'
apartment where he used a screwdriver to open the door because it did not have
a door handle allowing ready access from Ellis' apartment.

(R., pp.67-68

(Defendant's Ex. 3).) Thus, the record indicates that the need to access the
maintenance room through the apartment was created by Ellis, who trespassed
into the room and moved items.

More importantly, the parole officer did not

acquire information by trespass because he only gained access to a place he
had permission to be and Eiiis's consent to parole searches means he was not a
trespasser in the apartment.

D.

Ellis Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
Ellis has also failed to show any entry or search was not justified by his

Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of parole. Ellis argues the search of
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the maintenance room was not a valid parole search because the state did not
introduce the original Fourth Amendment waiver into the record at the
suppression hearing 1 and the Fourth Amendment waiver was not in effect at the
time of the search because of Ellis' arrest and subsequent incarceration. (R.,
pp.12-23.) The district court correctly held the "issuance of a warrant is not the
equivalent of the revocation of a parole," thereby not acting to suspend the
conditions of parole including the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. (R.,
pp.196-198.)
Below and on appeal Ellis relies on language in Idaho Code § 20-228 for
his position that his Fourth Amendment waiver was no longer in effect once a
warrant was issued alleging a violation of his parole. (Appellant's brief, pp.23.)
The statute reads as follows:
The commission for pardons and parole, in releasing a
person on parole, shall specify in writing the conditions of parole,
and a copy of such conditions shall be given to the person paroled.
Whenever the commission finds that a parolee may have violated
the conditions of parole, the written order of the commission, signed
by a member or members of the commission or the executive
director, shall be sufficient warrant for any law enforcement officer
to take into custody such person, and it is hereby made the duty of
all sheriffs, police, constables, parole and probation officers, prison
officials and other peace officers, to execute such order. Such
warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole until a
determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has
been made pursuant to a revocation hearing. From and after the
issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any
convicted person and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a
fugitive from justice. Such person so recommitted must serve out
the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on
1

The district court noted in denying Ellis' motion to suppress that "[t]here [was] no
question, that when [Ellis] was granted parole, he was subject to a valid
requirement that he submit to warrantless searches" (R., p.198) as well as the
fact that Ellis had "not challenged the validity of the waiver" (R., p.196).
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parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; unless the commission,
in its discretion, shall determine otherwise, but nothing herein
contained shall prevent the commission from again paroling such
prisoners at its discretion.
LC. § 20-228.
Ellis' reliance on State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60, 57 P.3d 771 (2002), for the
position that issuance of a parole violation warrant rendered his previously valid
Fourth Amendment waiver void (Appellant's brief, pp.15-20) is misplaced as this
Court determined l.C. § 20-228 did not control the "resolution of the motions to
suppress" in Fuller's case. Fuller, 138 Idaho at 63, 57 P.3d at 774. Ellis was still
on parole for his conviction.

As the district court noted: "[t]he issuance of a

warrant is not the equivalent of the revocation of parole.

Parole cannot be

revoked until there is a due process hearing." (R., p.197.) Although arrested on
an allegation that he had violated the terms and conditions of his parole, Ellis
was still entitled to a hearing to determine if he had in fact violated his parole.
Only then could his parole be revoked. Mattoon v. Blades, 145 Idaho 634, 181
P.3d 1242 (2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011 )). See Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (state must provide due process prior to
revocation of parole);

also People v. Ely, 76 Cal.App.3d 1006, 143 Cal.Rptr.

344 (1978) (parole consent to search still effective after parole suspended from
commitment for substance abuse treatment); People v. DuBose, 17 Cal.App.3d
43, 48, 94 Cal.Rptr. 376, 379 (Cal.App. 1971) (at the time of arrest, defendant's
legal status was that of parolee whose parole was subject to revocation for
cause, and also that of escapee and fugitive from justice; this status continued
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pending ultimate disposition of the charges of parole violation). Because Ellis
remained a parolee until the final disposition of the allegations of parole violation,
he was still under obligation to conform his conduct to the terms of parole including terms such as not engaging in criminal conduct and submitting to
searches.

Suspension of parole served only to suspend his limited physical

freedom pending resolution of the parole violation charges.
Ellis asserts his parole was "suspended" by his arrest on the Parole
Commission's warrant prohibiting a warrantless search for evidence of previous
violations of his parole. Ellis describes the situation in terms of a contract:
Since parole is technically revoked it logically follows that the parole
agreement is either suspended or terminated and, therefore
unenforceable. Another way to think about it is through contract
law. Once Mr. Ellis lost the benefit of the parole agreement,
release from custody, the State can no longer enforce the
agreement.
(Appellant's brief, p.17.) Ellis' contract argument fails on two levels. First, parole
cannot be "technically revoked" by the issuance of a warrant. A revocation can
only be accomplished by a decision entered by the Parole Commission following
a hearing. That had not yet happened when Ellis' parole officer went to his home
to search the storage room attached to Ellis' apartment upon obtaining
information that Ellis was attempting to destroy evidence of further violations.
Additionally, the mere allegation of a violation does not relieve a parolee of the
benefit of the agreements or his rights therein. Ellis still had the right to a hearing
to determine if he had violated the terms prior to a revocation.
Had Ellis no longer been subject to warrantless searches of a condition of
his parole, the officer was still justified in searching for evidence of a parole
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violation.

Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy

against governmental intrusion.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006);

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a probationer is subject to
warrantless searches by a probation officer if that probation officer has
reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S.
at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39
(2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after conviction but before
sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion); State v. Adams, 146
Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on
suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search
condition").
In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242-44
(2006), this Court upheld the search of a probationer based on reasonable
suspicion even though there was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the
time of the search. In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that "welldeveloped law in this area establishes that probation searches may be
conducted without consent when the officers are there to investigate reasonable
suspicion of violation of probation terms." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748,
250 P.3d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Klingler and distinguishing State v.
Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1983), in which a probation
search based on reasonable suspicion was upheld where there was no consent
to search as a condition of probation).
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Here Ellis' parole officer had reasonable suspicion that Ellis was in
violation of his parole because he was in possession of drug paraphernalia and
controlled substances based on a call from Ellis' neighbor with information that
Ellis wanted her to go into his apartment to remove incriminating evidence. (R.,
p.193.) Because the parole search was justified by reasonable suspicion it was
constitutionally proper and as such, should be affirmed by this Court. See,

~.

McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v.
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court
reaches the correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the
order on the correct theory).
Additionally, the information the parole officer had that Ellis was reaching
out from custody to have incriminating evidence removed supports the district
court's finding the search was "justified on the basis of exigent circumstances."
(R., pp.195-195.)

It is well settled that entries necessitated by "exigent

circumstances" do not offend the warrant requirement.

Michigan v. Tyler, 436

U.S 499, 509 (1978); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225
(1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App.
1996). "Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement,
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence is justification for what would
otherwise be illegal police conduct."

State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 748, 692

P.2d 1174, 1180 (1984); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)
(imminent risk of destruction of evidence is an exigency that justifies a
warrantless search); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383
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(Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 559, 716 P.2d 1328,
1331 (Ct. App. 1986) (same). In order for the this exception to apply, the police
must have probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the place to be
searched and must also possess "a reasonable belief that unless they act, the
evidence will be destroyed." Hoak, 107 Idaho at 748-49, 692 P.2d at 1180-81
(footnote omitted); accord Rusho, 110 Idaho at 559, 716 P.2d at 1331 (citing
Mincey, 437 U.S. 385) ("Probable cause and a compelling emergency, such as
imminent destruction of evidence ... must be shown."). Applying these principles
in this case, the district court correctly ruled that the officers were justified by
exigent circumstances in accessing the maintenance room through Ellis'
apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence. Because Ellis had "contacted
his neighbor from the jail to get her to remove evidence," it was reasonable of the
parole officer to "conclude that haste was essential." (R., p.196.)
Finally, Ellis maintains any consent given by the landlord to search the
maintenance room through Ellis' apartment was invalid because the landlord did
not have the authority to consent to a search of his apartment itself. (Appellant's
brief, p.25.) As discussed in Section "C" above, the access of the maintenance
room, for which Ellis has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy,
through Ellis' apartment was necessitated by Ellis' own actions of trespassing in
the maintenance room and moving items which required entrance through his
apartment. As the district court correctly concluded in finding valid consent by
the landlord to search the maintenance room, "the landlord could consent to the
search of the storage area because the landlord possessed common authority
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over that area even if the defendant's access were legitimate." (R., p.195.) See
State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 279, 16 P.3d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 2000)
(Permission for a warrantless search "need not come from the defendant; it may
be obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.")

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and
district court's order denying Ellis' motion to suppress.
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